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No-signalling-based version of Zurek’s derivation of quantum probabilities: A note on
“Environment-assisted invariance, entanglement, and probabilities in quantum
physics”
Howard Barnum
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(Dated: October 31, 2018)
Zurek has derived the quantum probabilities for Schmidt basis states of bipartite quantum systems
in pure joint states, from the assumption that they should be not be affected by one party’s action
if the action can be undone by the other party (“envariance of probability”) and an auxiliary
assumption. We argue that a natural generalization of the auxiliary assumption is actually strong
enough to yield the Born rule itself, but that Zurek’s argument and protocol can be adapted to
do without this assumption, at the cost of using envariance of probability in both directions. We
consider alternative motivations for envariance, one based on the no-signalling constraint that actions
on one subsystem of a quantum system not allow signalling to another subsystem entirely distinct
from the first, and another which is perhaps strongest in the context of a relative-state interpretation
of quantum mechanics. In part because of this, we argue that the relative appeal of our version and
the original version of Zurek’s argument depends in part upon whether one interprets the quantum
formalism in terms of relative states or definite measurement outcomes.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ta, 03.65.Yz, 03.67.-a
In a recent paper [1], Wojciech Zurek provides a deriva-
tion of the Born rule for quantum probabilities from other
aspects of quantum mechanics, and an auxiliary assump-
tions. Central to his argument is the possibility of “en-
variance”: the existence of states of composite systems
SE and nontrivial unitaries acting only one part of the
system (say S), such that the unitary’s effect can be un-
done by acting on the other part. Zurek uses the as-
sumption (which he also sometimes calls “envariance,”
and which we will always try to qualify as “envariance of
probabilities”): that probabilities ascribed to states of S
should be unaffected by a transformation uS on S when
the composite system is in a state envariant under uS.
In concert with a “pedantic” auxiliary assumption about
probabilities, this enables him to derive the usual quan-
tum probability rule. One purpose of our comment is to
point out that if both envariance and no-signalling are
formulated symmetrically with respect to interchange of
subsystems S and E, then (a) the auxiliary assumption is
actually rather strong, and a natural strengthening of it
is strong enough to give the Born rule directly, but (b) the
protocol Zurek gives in his argument supports a closely
related argument that uses only envariance of probabili-
ties. The envariance-based arguments establish quantum
probabilities only for subsystems of composite systems in
entangled states, but, especially within a relative-state
viewpoint such as Zurek’s, this may well suffice for using
quantum theory to make predictions. As we understand
Zurek’s argument, it uses both assumptions, but each
in only one direction, and we also explore the possibility
that, especially from the relative state point of view, each
of the assumptions might be justified only in the direction
Zurek uses it. From this point of view, our work clari-
fies both the formal structure of Zurek’s argument and
its close relation to the relative state interpretation, and
explores similar arguments exploiting “envariance,” and
their appeal given alternative interpretations. We view
the motivation for the symmetric version of envariance
of probabilities as somewhat different than Zurek’s pri-
mary motivation: we view it as a “no-signalling” assump-
tion. Of course, Zurek alludes to this motivation when he
notes that no signalling from one subsystem to another
(aka “causality,” especially when the systems are space-
like separated) implies envariance of probabilities. He
views causality as a “more costly assumption” because
it explicitly assumes that instantaneous signalling is im-
possible for all states and local transformations, not just
envariant combinations of them. The version of Zurek’s
argument we give below uses envariance in both direc-
tions; we envision using no-signalling as a motivation for
the envariance-of-probability assumptions used in the ar-
gument, and strictly speaking do not require the full no-
signalling assumption which, as Zurek has pointed out, is
in the above sense stronger. We note, however, that if no-
signalling is restricted to apply not necessarily between
arbitrary distinct subsystems of a composite system, but
only between spacelike-separated ones, the assumption
becomes neither logically weaker nor stronger than (and
if restricted to envariant state-transformation combina-
tions, logically weaker than) Zurek’s envariance assump-
tion. This raises the question of whether, when restricted
to “no faster-than-light signalling,” the assumption still
suffices to derive probabilities for the outcomes of all
quantum experiments. The motivations for envariance
will be discussed further below.
As a preliminary, we note that Zurek often works
within the Everett “relative state” interpretation [2, 3], in
which quantum measurement is viewed as a situation in
which an observer O, who is possibly in contact with an
environment E and possibly some apparatus A, evolves
jointly with a “measured” system S. Measurements are
viewed as evolutions that correlate some set of mutually
2orthogonal subspaces of S (which may be viewed as the
eigenspaces of an observable being measured) with states,
or at least with orthogonal eigenspaces, which we call
“pointer spaces,” in which the observer is having distinct
experiences (e.g. seeing a detector flash or fail to flash).
(This observer eigenspace decomposition is likely also sin-
gled out by its tendency to “decohere,” i.e. become core-
lated with the environment.) On this interpretation there
is no physical “collapse” associated with measurement,
but one may ask for probabilities assigned to the differ-
ent orthogonal statevector components associated with
the decomposition, representing the likelihood that one
will subjectively experience one’s consciousness traveling
along one of the branches picked out by this decompo-
sition (cf. [4]). In our opinion, the version of Zurek’s
argument we give below does not depend crucially on
whether measurement is interpreted in this way, or as in-
volving “collapse,” or in some other way (for example as
involving “collapse” of our knowledge, say, in a process
similar to Bayesian updating [5]). However, the choice of
interpretation might profoundly affect the motivation for
making the assumptions used in the argument. The issue
in the formal part of the argument is what probabilities
can consistently be attributed to orthogonal subspaces,
and it arises on any interpretation, though it is perhaps of
more concern on the relative state interpretation, within
which there is often felt a need to “derive” probabilities
from the nonprobabilistic statements about the nature of
the state, as an objective property of the universe, that
constitute the core of the theory; other approaches are of-
ten more comfortable with taking explicit specification of
probabilities as part of the theory. From the point of view
of (modestly) formal arguments, the distinction between
this relative state approach and the others we consider
lies in the fact that with relative state, we seek to assign
probabilities to components of the statevector, whereas
with the others, we seek a rule assigning probabilities to
mutually orthogonal subspaces in some decomposition of
the Hilbert space (given a statevector). The difference is
subtle, and for our purposes may be essentially obliter-
ated by some arguments we give below (but these rely on
symmetric no-signaling).
Central to Zurek’s argument is the peculiar nature of
composite quantum systems, notably the possibility of
“envariance.” A state |ψ〉 of SE is said to be envariant
with respect to a unitary uS if there exists a unitary uE
such that
(1l⊗ uE)(uS ⊗ 1l)|ψ〉 = |ψ〉 . (1)
That is, the effect of doing uS on a system when the joint
state of system and environment is |ψ〉 can be undone by
some unitary acting only on the environment.
Zurek’s argument involves the assumption, “envariance
of probabilities,” that, given a state ψSE , any aspect of
the system that can be changed by a transformation un-
der which the state is envariant, should not affect the
probabilities ascribed to states of the system. He notes
that envariance assures causality: if aspects of S that can
be influenced solely by acting on E affected probabilities
in S, we could signal from S to E by manipulating them
in E . Actually, we prefer to call this “no-signalling”; if
the unitary uE and the “measurement” on S whose prob-
abilities it affects can be performed fast enough, com-
pared to the spacelike separation of S and E , such sig-
nalling would violate causality, which is certainly one of
the main reasons for ruling it out. Perhaps, however,
there is a stronger argument for no S-to-E signalling in
a relative state interpretation. On such an interpreta-
tion, once macroscopic aspects of E have been correlated
with S (the system has been “measured” by an observer
who is part of E), the ability to affect probabilities of
components of the state in subspaces corresponding to
those distinct macroscopic aspects of E, by manipulat-
ing S, jeopardizes the interpretation of these numbers as
“probabilities” at all. (At a minimum, it would require,
to have probabilities for the results of a measurement on
S, that we know the entire subsequent dynamics of S, and
consistently ascribe the same probabilities to all evolved
decompositions after definite results are observed in E–
something that seems very difficult to do—though this
is not a proof— in any other way than by making prob-
abilities a function of the square modulus of the wave-
function component.) One might very well object that
probabilities are not “objective” aspects of the situation,
that they represent beliefs about how likely things are to
happen. More precisely (within a generally subjectivist
approach to probability in its aspect as something to be
used in science and everyday life [6, 7, 8], an approach to
which I am rather partial), one might say it represents
constraints imposed by rationality (and certain technical
assumptions) on the bets or decisions one might condi-
tion on outcomes of a quantum or measurement (cf. e.g.
[9]). There may or may not be difficulties with extending
this subjectivist approach to the relative-state interpre-
tation. The potential difficulty is that since the “out-
comes” are purely perspectival, from the vantage point
of the decision-maker before the branching of conscious-
ness, the objective situation after the decision, i.e. the
full entangled state vector, is the “real” outcome. The
goal must then be, a´ la Deutsch [10], to attempt to show
that a rational decision-maker should behave “as if” the
branches had probabilities given by the Born rule. From
either of these points of view, however, the argument
that we are manipulating probabilities of macroscopically
distinct subspaces of E by manipulating S and it is is
manifestly undesirable that this affect the probabilities
of outcomes, if it retains any validity, has to be glossed
as something like: a rational choice between different ex-
periments on S should be unaffected by how S will be
treated after the observer (as part of E) “branches” into
macroscopically different conscious states. Indeed, in
many cases when apparatus (possibly rapidly decohered
by other parts of the environment) mediates between ob-
server and system, one might also find it reasonable to
assume that nothing done to S after it has become thus
entangled with “pointer subspaces” in the apparatus and
3environment, should affect the decision between experi-
ments. (All this requires assumptions, typical in classical
decision theory as well and capable of being formalized,
that the system itself is not something the observer par-
ticularly cares about—though this formalization is not
a trivial matter, since it requires distinguishing between
“not caring about manipulations on the system because
they don’t affect things we care about”, and not car-
ing about them per se, i.e. assuming we know nothing
about how they affect other things.) This sort of as-
sumption starts to seem rather closely related to some of
the invariance-of-decision assumptions made, for exam-
ple, by Wallace [11, 12] and on Wallace’s interpretation
of him, by Deutsch. In what follows, we use the language
of “probabilities for outcomes” or “probabilities for com-
ponents of the state vector.” It is true that in the latter
case, most naturally associated with the relative state
view, the assumption that rational decision-makers will
behave as if they had probabilities may be a substantive
one, requiring arguments of the sort put forth by Deutsch
and Wallace. (I will make the side comment that from a
decsion-theoretic point of view of applied probability, it
could be reasonable to maintain that to behave as if one
has probabilities is to have them.)
For those arguments that do not require interpretation
as “system” and “environment,” we introduce Stan and
Emma as counterparts of the more usual Alice and Bob.
Stan and Emma may be thought of as characters who
operate on the systems S and E. The first step of Zurek’s
argument is to point out that if the state is
|ψSE〉 =
N∑
k=1
αk|σk〉|εk〉 , (2)
where |σk〉 are some orthonormal basis for S, and |εk〉 one
for E (for some choice of such bases, any pure state has
this form), then “an envariant description of the system
(i.e. S) must ignore phases of the coefficients” αk. “Such
a description must be based on a set of pairs {|αk|, |σk〉}.”
That is, when the state has this form—and any pure state
does—probabilities involving the system S must be based
only on the absolute values of coefficients, and the basis
elements they are attached to—exactly the information
contained in the reduced density matrix. We consider
this step to establish, from no-signalling (aka envariance
of probabilities), that when the joint state of SE is pure,
the probabilities of orthogonal subspaces in any subspace
decomposition of S—are independent of the phases in the
Schmidt expansion of |ψ〉. Note that this may be more
than Zurek is concerned with: he is concerned primar-
ily with the probabilities of the decomposition of S into
the states σk, or E into the states εk, for if the joint
state SE is viewed as the outcome of a measurement
“in the Schmidt basis” on S, by an environment E that
includes the observer, whose “definite measurement re-
sults” line up with the Schmidt basis for E, ascribing
probabilities to these suffices for ascribing probabilities
to “definite measurement results” (subjectively experi-
enced, of course) in the relative state interpretation; any
measurement gives rise to such a situation.
Note that we have not yet established that, for a given
state, the probabilities of components in subspaces are
independent of the subspace decomposition in which they
occur, an assumption similar to that made in Gleason’s
theorem, and which might allow us to use Gleason’s the-
orem as part of an argument for quantum probabilities.
Of course, a potential virtue of the argument from en-
variance is precisely that it does not make any such as-
sumption to begin with.
Another possible assumption is that in a decomposi-
tion such as (2), the probabilities of obtaining k when
measuring in the basis |σk〉 on S, and obtaining it when
measuring in the basis |εk〉 on E, are the same. We call
this the Perfect Correlation Principle (PCP). Without a
noncontextuality assumption, however, this is not imme-
diately evident, and needs to be established. The reason
it seems plausible is that both correspond to the same
component, |σk〉|εk〉. In other situations, the following
may be used. Clearly, one typical way in which this mea-
surement outcome occurs is when each party measures
some local observable of which it spans an eigenspace.
Whether or not Stan measures anything should be im-
material to Emma’s probability, by no-signalling. Hence
the probability of Emma’s getting |ψk〉 should not be af-
fected by the context in which |εk〉 is measured on E,
or even whether it is measured at all. Incidentally, this
establishes noncontextuality of probabilities of Schmidt
basis states in local measurements, since if the local con-
text affected the probability, that changed probability
would be detectable by the other party.
(Possibly some more elaborate variant of the above ar-
gument, probably requiring no-signalling via arbitrary
states, not just Schmidt basis states, but perhaps only
in one direction, could establish noncontextuality of ar-
bitrary measurements, at least when the joint state is
pure; this could be worth looking into as an alternative
derivation of probabilities.)
The next step of Zurek’s argument, unlike the first
one, does not extend to probabilities of arbitrary local
measurements, but concerns “the relation between the
coefficients αk of the corresponding set of the candidate
pointer states {|σk〉} and their probabilities.”
The key part of this step involves a situation where
all, or some, of the |αk| are equal. A simplified version of
it, capturing everything essential, involves the following
protocol (in which all states appearing are joint states
of SE, with S, appearing on the left, locally acted on by
“Stan” and E, to the right, locally acted on by “Emma”).
|ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉 . (3)
↓ Emma swaps 0, 1 .
|ψ2〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|1〉+ |1〉|1〉 . (4)
↓ Stan swaps 0, 1 .
4|ψ3〉 = 1√
2
(|1〉|1〉+ |0〉|0〉 ≡ |ψ1〉 . (5)
Here “swaps 0, 1” means, of course, performs the uni-
tary transformation whose matrix in the basis |0〉, |1〉 is
σx. Emma’s swap can be undone by an Stan unitary; in
Zurek’s terms, Emma’s states |0〉 and |1〉 are envariantly
swappable.
For use in the discussion below, we define probabilities
pX(i|ψj), i ∈ {0, 1}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, X ∈ {A,B}, to be X ’s
(i.e. Stan’s or Emma’s) probability for state |i〉, when the
joint state is |ψj〉. Note that some may prefer to assign
probabilities to states or subspaces of the overall system;
the probabilities just mentioned can be so interpreted, by
no-signalling arguments of the type associated with the
Perfect Correlation Principle. The no-signalling assump-
tion required may, however, be stronger than Zurek’s in
that it is not restricted to transformations under which
the state is envariant (but that may already apply to the
one used in the derivation of the PCP itself). In this ap-
plication (contrary to the one above) no-signalling must
be applied to non-Schmidt-basis measurements.
The PCP itself establishes that
pS(0|ψ1) = pE(0|ψ1), pS(1|ψ1) = pE(1|ψ1) ,
pS(0|ψ2) = pE(1|ψ2), pS(1|ψ2) = pE(0|ψ2) . (6)
Thus, for the purpose of interpreting our arguments be-
low in terms perhaps more congenial to relative state-er’s
and to Zurek, one can identify, for example, both p2A(0)
and p2B(1) with the probability of |0〉|1〉 in state |ψ2〉.
At this point, Zurek invokes “a rather general (and
pedantic) assumption about the measuring process:
When the states are swapped, the corresponding prob-
abilities get relabeled (i↔ j). This leads us to conclude
that the probabilities for any two envariantly swappable
|σk〉 are equal.”
We interpret this assumption to be about the relation
of the probabilities pi, pj of states i and j of S before
the swap, to the probabilities p′i, p
′
j of outcomes i and
j of S after a unitary that swaps i and j is performed
on S. The assumption is that p′i = pj and p
′
j = pi. In
its narrowest version, the assumption might be meant
only to apply to envariant swaps like those in the pro-
tocol above. Zurek has described the assumption to us
as being essentially invariance of the probabilities under
redirection of the detector output channels. The idea
would seem to be that i and j are just “arbitrary la-
bels” anyway. Another description of it—using the lan-
guage of measurement—might be be “swapping states
and then measuring an observable for which these states
span eigenspaces, has the same probabilities (for eigen-
values of the observable) as just measuring the observ-
able conjugated by the swap operator.” Phrased thus,
it is a special case of an assumption that others have
used to derive the Born probabilities—which one might
formulate as “evolving and then measuring is measur-
ing the evolved observable” (EATMIMTEO). The others
include [11, 12], who argues this was what was really
meant in [10], and perhaps also [13]. In [14] we charac-
terized the special case as “akin to Laplace’s principle of
insufficient reason” for probabilities (that for N mutually
exclusive events between which we can see no relevant dif-
ferences, the probabilities of each event should be taken
to be 1/N), and Zurek has also mentioned Laplace in this
connection. However, it is probably preferable to avoid
the reformulation as a case of EATMIMTEO, for the for-
malism of assigning measurement results to eigenspaces
of observables, rather than to states in a decomposition
of a state vector, carries with it an automatic assump-
tion that the phase of a state cannot affect its probability,
a matter that Zurek is at pains to establish via an en-
variance argument. (Of course, since the assumptions of
[11, 12] are ultimately interpreted in relative state terms,
Wallace’s motivation for this special case—or perhaps for
the general case—of EATMIMTEO might turn out to be
essentially envariance-based, as well.)
However it is justified, the assumption allows immedi-
ate derivation of the equality of the probabilities pS(0|ψ1)
and pS(1|ψ1) above. Indeed, if it is not restricted to en-
variant situations (and there seems to be no reason to
so restrict it, although Zurek’s argument can live with
such a restriction) it also gives p(|ψi〉||ψ〉) = p(|ψj〉||ψ〉)
for i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}, for any state |ψ〉 = ∑Nk=1 αk|ψk〉 in
which αl = αm for all l,m ∈ {1, ..., N}.
The use contemplated for the PA in Zurek’s argu-
ment is perhaps as follows. Consider the protocol above.
By the pedantic assumption, pE(0|ψ1) = pE(1|ψ2). By
envariance of probabilities, pE(1|ψ2) = pE(1|ψ3) ≡
pE(1|ψ1). This establishes pE(0|ψ1) = pE(1|ψ2), as de-
sired (so each is equal to 1/2).
We propose to use the same protocol, but avoid the
pedantic assumption, using no-signalling twice (once in
each direction) and invoking perfect correlation (the
PCP, which we argued above follows from no-signalling).
The argument is as follows. By no signalling in the
E-to-S direction (i.e., by envariance of probabilities),
pS(0|ψ1) = pS(0|ψ2). By perfect correlation (the PCP,
argued for above), pS(0|ψ2) = pE(1|ψ2). By no-signalling
in the S-to-E direction, pE(1|ψ2) = pE(1|ψ3) ≡
pE(1|ψ1). By perfect correlation, pE(1|ψ1) = pS(1|ψ1).
Thus we have established pS(0|ψ1) = pS(1|ψ1).
Implicit in our remarks about the PCP is that, if de-
sired, both of these arguments can be translated into
arguments entirely about the probabilities of the states
|0〉|0〉, |1〉|1〉, |0〉|1〉, |1〉|0〉 in the superpositions |ψi〉; the
second argument then becomes shorter since the PCP
need not be invoked. The above formulation, however,
makes it clear that they can also be formulated in a way
that refers to probabilities of measurement outcomes on
Stan’s and Emma’s sides; these arguments are not nec-
essarily tied to the relative state view.
Essentially the same arguments establish that when
there are N equal |αk|, each probability must be pk =
1/N . Then Zurek establishes that when the real parts
of αk are square roots of rationals mk/M , say, the as-
sociated probabilities must be mk/M . The argument is
5a straightforward use of a local ancillary system to turn
the state into a superposition of states each of which has
the real parts of its amplitude equal to
√
1/M , the above
results implying that these must have equal probability,
and envariance of probabilities (in our terminology, no
signalling from the system that has interacted with the
ancilla, to the one that hasn’t).
The passage to arbitrary amplitudes involves an as-
sumption of continuity of the probabilities in the ampli-
tudes, which Zurek does not explicitly justify. How it
might be justified probably depends on the interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics one adopts. If the quantum
formalism is viewed as a handy mathematical way of sys-
tematizing or compactly “representing” the probabilities
of experimental results, continuity of probabilities might
be a desirable desideratum for representations—if a rep-
resentation is a structure with a natural topology, but
neighborhoods in that topology do not imply neigbor-
hoods in probabilities, that suggests that the topological
aspect of the representation is superfluous (but perhaps it
could be needed to represent dynamics, system combina-
tion, or some other aspect of things beyond the “statics”
of probabilities). In the present context, however, such
an “operational” argument would be backwards, since we
are trying to derive probabilities. It is not clear to us why
one would rule out discontinous probability assignments
even though they may seem “pathological.” Wallace [11]
has given some arguments based on robustness of prob-
abilities to small perturbations, and perhaps something
can be made of these; but the “smallness” of a pertur-
bation, surely meant as nearness to the identity opera-
tor in some standard metric, itself would seem to need
an “operational,” perhaps probabilistic, interpretation.
The trickiest part of Gleason’s theorem is an argument—
using noncontextuality—that probabilities must be con-
tinuous. One might be able to avoid assuming continuity
by adapting this argument to the present context, where
probabilities are only being assigned to product states
of a composite system, and some limited noncontextual-
ity results are available from no-signalling arguments as
discussed in justifying the perfect correlation principle.
Perhaps the most important challenge to the whole
approach is the point that it only gives the probabilities
for Schmidt states of bipartite systems in pure states.
One can, and Zurek does, argue that especially within
a relative-state approach this is enough: that any mea-
surement process on a quantum system should be viewed
as resulting in the eigenspaces of the measured observ-
able being “Schmidt eigenspaces” for the decomposition
of a bipartite pure state of the system and the rest of the
world, with the Schmidt spaces of the rest of the world
taken to constitute its “pointer basis,” and we need only
assign probability to such spaces in order to interpret
quantum mechanics.
If we can argue that in such situations, my pointer
variables will always be well correlated with some vari-
ables sufficiently spacelike separated from them (which
could, perhaps, be variables of the “measured system”
itself) that causality prevents a signal from connecting
them with me during the time necessary to manipu-
late these variables, then no faster-than-light signalling,
rather than just no signalling, can be adduced as the ba-
sis of the argument for quantum probabilities. One might
be tempted to argue that by a unitary transformation, we
can always get my pointer variables so correlated, but to
argue that this does not affect probabilities is, it seems to
me, a use of the powerful EATMIMTEO, or some kindred
invariance principle. However, using causality to buttress
the appeal of no-signalling appears less crucial within the
relative state interpretation. There, with probabilities
assigned to orthogonal components of the overall state
vector, we may note that regardless of spacelike sepa-
ration or the time it takes to do manipulations, we may
perform a unitary on the system that has been measured,
and it would be extraordinarily bizarre, perhaps inconsis-
tent, for the probabilities of the already-recorded results of
the measurement to be changed by such an operation—
where by the fact that the measurement result is already
recorded, we mean that orthogonal subspaces of the sys-
tem have gotten correlated with (roughly) orthogonal
“pointer” subspaces of the rest of the world, each de-
scribing a more or less definite experience of the observer.
However, at heart this may just be another guise for an
invariance assumption, if a particularly reasonable (and
certainly empirically supported) one. Perhaps this sort of
argument motivated Zurek to reduce his stress on causal-
ity and signalling. In this argument, it is less the fact
that one can signal from S to E via a unitary on E, and
more the fact that the unitary apparently changes prob-
abilities of an “event”—admittedly, the subjective event
of an observer’s conscious perspective turning out to be
the one associated with one pointer subspace rather than
another—that has already happened, that motivates en-
variance of probabilities.
In conclusion, we concur with Zurek that in a frame-
work with a distinguished bipartite factorization of
Hilbert space, Zurek’s notion of envariance of a given bi-
partite state under a given local transformation enables
one to derive the quantum probabilities for the Schmidt
basis states of a pure bipartite state, from the assump-
tion of “envariance of probabilities,” which we argue can
be motivated as a case of “no signalling from either sys-
tem to the other by means of local transformations.” We
suggest modifying the second step of Zurek’s argument
slightly to avoid a “pedantic assumption” which, we ar-
gue, is stronger than it seems. And we discuss the ap-
peal of the envariance assumption, and the sufficiency
of its conclusion for describing the use we actually make
of quantum mechanics for probabilistic prediction. Both
of these are strongest within a relative state view, but
still have some appeal from other points of view. In-
deed, Zurek’s original argument, with its use of envari-
ance in one direction, and a “pedantic” symmetry as-
sumption in the other, might be thought to use envari-
ance of probabilities in the direction in which, at least
on a relative-state interpretation, it is most plausible,
6and the pedantic assumption which allows him to use
envariance only in one direction might be thought to be
best justified within the relative-state interpretation as
well. Some of these assumptions seem to be related to,
if perhaps weaker than, assumptions made by Wallace
and Deutsch in their derivations of probabilities within
the relative state interpretation. Interesting directions
for further research remain, including clarification of the
relationship between Zurek’s assumptions and those used
by Deutsch and Wallace, and clarification of the justifi-
cation for assigning probabilities at all, on the relative
state interpretation.
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